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The sociopolitical debate of our times features much discussion centered around diversity in society.
The rapid rise of globalization, the softening of national boundaries, and the drop in communication
and transportation costs have all contributed to make these issues increasingly compelling. This paper
is focused on two speci…c questions that arise in this context: what happens when “di¤erent” people
interact with each other, and arepeoplebetter o¤inhomogeneouscommunities, wherethey only interact
with others of their own type, or in mixed communities?
These themes are clearly related to the literature on diversity and economic performance, as well
as the literature on discrimination. However, much of this literature – such as Becker (1957), Arrow
(1973) and Alesina and La Ferrara (2000, 2005) – assumes that individuals have direct preferences
over the composition of society, characterized by a “taste for discrimination”. Hence, diversity is never
desirable, as it simply reduces welfare without generating any bene…ts.1 However, there is no reason
to suppose that individual preferences over society composition are the primitive. We normally assume
that utility depends on behavior and choices. In this case, di¤erent compositions of society may well
a¤ect behavior and choices and hence utility, but then preferences over the nature of one’s community
are derived indirectly, and arise because the composition of the community determines the behavior of
individuals and their fellow community-members.
The motivation of this paper is to model this latter approach and to see what it implies for the in-
duced preferences on community composition. We model communities in a loose sense, as environments
where people interact with each other. Interactions may emerge from geographical proximity (in which
case we think of communities as cities or neighborhoods), or from other types of links (as in the case
of the “academic community”). We characterize the behavior of people as a function of the make up
of their community. This allows us to gain a far deeper understanding of the forces that underpin the
desirability of diversity or homogeneity within communities. In particular, our main contribution is to
show that there are always counteracting forces (heterogeneity involves both costs and bene…ts), and
that within our model people always bene…t from having some strangers in their community.
There is a vast literature on social interactions – such as Akerlof (1997), Glaeser and Scheinkman
(2002), Bisin, Horst and Özgür (2006) and Kuran and Sandholm (2007).2 The focus of these, and
our, studies are social interactions that are not regulated by the price mechanism. These models
typically feature strategic complementarities, and assume that individual utility is a¤ected by (i) the
individual’s action, (ii) the average action of agents in the individual’s interacting group, and (iii)
1Other works – such as Lazear (1999) and Hong andPage (2001) – argue that diversity may be bene…cial, because it may
generate productivity gains. Essentially, the rationale isthat individuals belonging to di¤erenttypespossesscomplementary
sets of skills, abilities, or information; as a result, heterogeneous teams bene…t from a competitive advantage, stemming
from greater productivity. With respect to these works, our paper provides a novel rationale of why diversity may be
desirable.
2Other examples include Cooper and John (1986) (non-market interactions and business cycles), Glaeser, Sacerdote
and Scheinkman (1996) (social interactions and crime), B· enabou (1993, 1996) and Durlauf (1996a and 1996b) (social
interactions and educational choices). See also Manski (2000) for a general discussion on the economic analysis of social
interactions.
2personal characteristics/tasteshocks. Inthis paper, wefollow a similarapproach, although theobjective
of our investigation di¤ers from previous studies.3
More precisely, we build a model where, as in Kuran and Sandholm (2007), individual behavior
re‡ects a compromise between following one’s own personal preferences, and coordinating with the
choices of others. Actions may range from style of dressing, to punctuality, to alcohol consumption,
to style of conducting business a¤airs. Returns from social interaction are characterized by strategic
complementarities, and are greater when an individual selects an action that is close to the average
action ofthosewith whom heinteracts. For instance, my returns from trying to meet deadlines, or from
being on time for appointments, are higher if those with whom I interact behave in a similar way.4
We show that the utility that an individual expects to obtain when interacting in a community
depends on the precision with which he can forecast the actions of others in the community. In other
words, people are better o¤ when they face little strategic uncertainty. Intuitively, when the actions
of others are known, one can easily adapt to coordinate with them. In contrast, uncertainty over the
actions of others is unpleasant, because it makes it harder to coordinate. Preferences over community
composition therefore depend on the amount of strategicuncertainty faced by an individual in di¤erent
communities.
Wedivideindividualsinto “types”, which may re‡ect cultural background, ideology, religious beliefs,
ethical attitudesand so on. Individualsbelongingto thesametypehavemorein commonwitheachother
than individuals from di¤erent types. More speci…cally, we assume that the preferences of individuals
belonging to the sametypeare drawn from the samedistribution. This implies that, keeping everything
else equal, people …nd it easier to predict the behavior of those of their same type, and suggests that
individuals should be biased towards homogeneous communities. However, we …nd that this conjecture
is only partially correct. Although people would always rather live in communities where their type
is majoritarian (what we call “self-bias”), this bias is rather mild, and does not imply that they favor
homogeneity. In fact, as indicated, heterogeneity involves both costs and bene…ts.
The cost of heterogeneity arises because strangers are less predictable than people who are similar
to us. Keeping everything else equal, this increases strategic uncertainty. Intuitively, “stranger” is
synonymous of unknown, and this makes strangers somehow less attractive than people we are more
familiar with, and over whom we possess more information.
On the other hand, heterogeneity also generates bene…ts. These bene…ts are two-fold. First, the
presence of strangers acts as a coordination device for the incumbent members of the community –
what we call the coordination- (or cohesion) enhancing e¤ect of strangers. Intuitively, the desire to
coordinate with newcomers induces the incumbents to modify their behavior. People pay less attention
3The paper that is most closely related to the present one is Kuran and Sandholm (2007). However, that paper takes
an evolutionary approach, and concentrates on the distributions of preferences that will prevail in the very long-term, if
initially heterogeneous groups are mixed with each other. Preferences are modeled endogenously, and are allowed to very
from one generation to the next. Here, in contrast, we consider a shorter horizon, so that, for our purposes, preferences
are taken as exogenous.
4As mentioned above, the existence of strategic complementarities is a common assumption. For instance, in Akerlof
(1997) the probability of mutually bene…cial tradeis assumed to increase in the proximity of individual choices of location
in some “social space”.
3to their personal preferences and instead try to make their behavior more compatible with that of the
newcomers, by taking their average preferences into account. This increases coordination between the
incumbents and the newcomers and, crucially, it also increases coordination among the incumbents,
since they all modify their behaviors in the same direction – and also put less weight on their (partially
idiosyncratic) personal preferences. A by-product of this is that heterogeneity makes the incumbents’
behavior more predictable.
Second, heterogeneity introduces what we call a cultural diversi…cation e¤ect. This e¤ect arises
because, in mixed groups, a greater variety of behaviors can coexist. Thisdecreases theprobability that
any individual behavior is entirely out of line with the average. For instance, my e¤ort towards meeting
deadlines may betoo high compared to themajority ofpeopleoftype A, but may betoo low compared
to the majority of people of type B. Since I only care about the overall average, however, these two
e¤ects partially cancel out. Keeping everything else equal, this decreases aggregate uncertainty.
The bene…ts ofheterogeneity are connected with the notions of tolerance and integration. In mixed
communities, the desire to coordinate with others triggers a process of integration, where incumbents
modify their behavior to make it more consistent with that of the newcomers – and vice-versa, the
newcomers modify their behavior to make it more consistent with that of the incumbents. Integration
increases coordination between types but also within each type. The latter e¤ect is the coordination-
enhancing e¤ect of strangers. The cultural diversi…cation e¤ect of heterogeneity arises because mixed
groups support a wider range of behaviors than homogeneous groups. As a result, each individual faces
a lower probability of ending up as an “outlier”. In that sense, therefore, mixed communities can be
seen as more tolerant.
Overall, the interaction of the costs and bene…ts of heterogeneity implies that the ideal community
for any type t individual always includes a positive fraction of type t0 6= t. Hence, our results suggest
that people would always welcome some strangers in their midst. Once the share of strangers has
become su¢ciently large, however, people will start to be less welcoming. Attitudes towards strangers
are therefore not invariant, but crucially depend upon the existing mix in a community. For any given
type, the ideal share of strangers in their community is always greater than zero, but smaller than
one-half. The natural question is then whether mixed communities are sustainable in practice. We
address this issue by asking whether it is possible that both types t and t0 may be better o¤ when
coexisting in the same community, rather than in a homogeneous community of their own. We show
that the necessary and su¢cient conditions for this to be the case is that (i) people care su¢ciently
about coordinating with others and (ii) within the same type, preferences are su¢ciently dispersed.
Oneimplication that emerges from our analysis is that the bene…ts and costs of mixed communities
are two faces of the same coin. Strangers generate bene…ts precisely because their preferences are
uncorrelated with those of incumbents, and aretherefore less predictable. Policies of assimilation – that
aim at eradicating the di¤erences between types – will therefore reduce the costs of heterogeneity, but
also its bene…ts.
Finally, although the paper’s contribution is concerned with diversity, discrimination and social
interactions, it is also connected to the literature on the value of information, such as Morris and
4Shin (2002, 2005) and Angeletos and Pavan (2004, 2007(a) and 2007(b)). This literature focuses on
environments where agents are both concerned with adapting their actions to the realization of an
exogenous “fundamental”, and also with coordinating with the choices of others.5 Since information is
(at least partially) dispersed, di¤erent individuals may hold di¤erent beliefs about the fundamental, and
therefore also about other agents’ actions. Themodelsanalyzed by thisliteraturesharesimilarities with
ourmodel, and in thiscontext an interesting novel featureofour analysis isto show that, by altering the
shares of di¤erent types in the population, we also a¤ect the precision with which individuals can make
predictions on the actions of others – namely, the amount of strategic uncertainty faced by individuals
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model, while in
Section 3 we derive our results. Section 4 discusses implications and possible extensions of our analysis.
Section 5 concludes. All the proofs can be found in the Appendix.
2 Model
Background and Utility Functions A community contains a continuum of interacting individ-
uals. In each social interaction, an individual is matched with a representative sample of people from
his community, to form an interacting group. Matching is therefore exogenous. Each interacting group
contains a continuum of atomless individuals of unit mass, indexed by the unit interval [0; 1]: the mass
ofinteracting individuals is therefore equal to 1. Theactions that people select a¤ect their returns from
social interaction.
Social interactions exhibit strategic complementarities. That is, the return from social exchange for
an individual isgreaterthecloserhisaction to theactionsselected by theotherindividualsheis matched
with. As mentioned in the introduction, this is a common assumption in models of social interactions .
Moreover, individuals possess personal preferences, that also a¤ect their utility of undertaking a certain
action. The utility of an individual i who selects action ai 2 R is




0 ajdj is the average action of the individuals j with whom i is matched, ￿ 2 (0;1)
is a constant that takes the same value for all individuals, and ﬁi 2 R is a taste parameter that
re‡ects i’s preferences.6 The parameter ￿ measures theweight given to social coordination or individual
preferences in the individual utility function: when ￿ is high (close to one) individuals are almost
exclusively concerned with selecting an action that is close to theaverage action selected in their group.
When ￿ is low (close to zero), individualscarealmost exclusively about theextent to which their actions
match their preferences.
5A typical example is that of an entrepreneur investing in a new sector: the returns to his investment depend both on
the sector’s inherent productivity (the “fundamental”), and on the amount of aggregate investment ‡owing in from other
entrepreneurs.
6In what follows, the term “preferences” will always be utilized to indicate ﬁi. Note that our model could also
accommodate alternative interpretations of ﬁi. For instance, ﬁi could capture individual i’s identity or self-image, as
in Akerlof and Kranton (2000).
5Note that utility here only depends on the distance between an individual’s action and the weighted
average of theactions of others and hispreferences, not on the action itself. As in Kuran and Sandholm
(2007), actions are therefore “economically neutral”, so that payo¤s do not depend on the nature of
the coordination achieved. This allows us to abstract from situations where one type has, on average,
inherently “superior” preferences. The actions we have in mind may range from punctuality, to style
of dressing, to the way of conducting business a¤airs – e.g., more or less formally. In each case, we
argue, there is no “objective” ranking – e.g., there isn’t a way of conducting business a¤airs which
is objectively better than others. Rather, the optimal action for an individual is a weighted average
between his personal preferences and the actions of those with whom he interacts.
Types Individuals are divided into mutually exclusive categories, or types. Types may be thought
of as re‡ecting cultural background (“City People” versus “Country Folk”), age (Young versus Old),
religious beliefs (Christians versus Muslims), ethical attitudes (Puritans versus Libertarians) and so on.
We take a somehow crude – but, we believe, illustrative – position, and categorize individuals into two
types, type A and type B. The share of individuals of each type in a community is common knowledge:
we assume that the proportion of individuals of type t = A;B is equal to ‚t, with ‚A + ‚B = 1.
Individuals belonging to the same type possess, on average, the same preferences. However, there exists
somewithin-typevariation, in that, within thesame type, di¤erent preferencesmay coexist. Weassume
that individual preferences are given by the sum of two components: a type-speci…c component equal
to „t +et, and an idiosyncratic component, equal to "i. The sum „t +et corresponds to the sum of
an average preference „t and a random element et, which captures the common e¤ect that speci…c
circumstances have on all individuals of type t. The taste parameter ﬁt
i of an individual i belonging to
type t =A;B is therefore equal to
ﬁt
i = „t +et +"i (2)
where for any type t = A; B, „t represents the average preferences of type t, et drawn as N (0;1)
represents a type-speci…c shock to preferences (arising from speci…c circumstances), with eA ? eB, and
"i, the idiosyncratic shock to preferences, is drawn as N (0; ￿) for a positive constant ￿, with "i ? "j
for i 6= j. Furthermore, we assume that the idiosyncratic shock to preferences is independent to the
type-speci…c shock, "i ? et for any i and t, and that average preferences „A and „B 6=„A are common
knowledge.7
Finally, remark that, as the variance of type-speci…c shocks is normalized to 1, the parameter ￿
measures the variance of the idiosyncratic shocks relative to the type-speci…c shocks.8
Information Individual preferences are private information. Each individual observes his own
ﬁt
i, but he is unable to discriminate between et and "i, the type-speci…c and the idiosyncratic shocks
a¤ecting his preferences. What we have in mind is that the speci…c circumstances surrounding social
7In Section 4 we discuss the robustness of our results to relaxing this assumption.
8Note that ￿ (as well as ￿) is the same for both types. In section 4 we discuss the case where ￿ and/or ￿ di¤er across
types.
6interactions may vary, and attitudes or preferences may vary with them. An individual may be unsure
of the attitude that people of a given type will tend to adopt in any given precise situation, although
he may have a good idea of the attitudes that they adopt on average, when speci…c circumstances are
averaged out.
Notice that the estimate that an individual i of type t can make of the preferences of a type-t0
individual can only be based on prior information, i.e., „t0. In contrast, when predicting thepreferences
of another person of type t, individual i possesses additional information, since he knows both „t and
ﬁt
i – which, from (2), is correlated with the preferences of others of the same type.
This captures the intuitively–appealing feature that the predictions that people can make of the
preferencesofindividualsoftheirsametypearemore precise than thosethey can makeofthepreferences
ofapersonofadi¤erent type. However, thepredictionsthat peoplemakeofthepreferencesofothersalso
di¤er from individual to individual, as they are based on private information – namely, an individual’s
personal preferences.9 As will become clear in the main body of the paper, this feature plays an
important role in our analysis.
Timing
Social exchanges occur at …xed intervals of time within communities. In each social exchange:
t = 0 Individuals are matched in interacting groups.
t =1 For each group, nature selects the (group-speci…c) realizations eA, eB and individual idiosyn-
cratic shocks.
t = 2 Each individual observes his personal preferences and selects his action.
t = 3 Payo¤s are realized.
Noticethat the realization of type–speci…c shocks is group–dependent. This re‡ects the notion that
type–speci…c shocks arise from the speci…c circumstances surrounding an interaction. These circum-
stances are common for all individualsin the same group, but vary across di¤erent interacting groups.10
3 Results
Having described our model, we are now in the position of introducing our results. We start o¤ by
characterizing the equilibrium of the game. First, utility maximization yields
ai =￿E(aj j ﬁi)+(1¡￿)ﬁi (3)
Individuals select actions that are a weighted average of their expectations over the average action
in their interacting group, and their preferences. Suppose that the proportion of individuals of type
9In a dynamic context, an individual’s private information may also re‡ect his personal past experiences. See section
4 for a fuller discussion on this possibility.
10Strictly speaking, we should therefore denote this element of the type-speci…c shocks as e
t
z, where the subscript z
indicates that the realization is speci…c to group z. This would however make the notation heavier, and is therefore
omitted. Note that this feature only matters for the results of Section 3.1 (community cohesion) and is irrelevant for those
in Section 3.2 (individual welfare).
7t = A; B in a given community is ‚t, and that of type t0 = fA;Bgnt is ‚t0
, where ‚t +‚t0
= 1. Using
the linear-normal from of the game, we can establish the following result:
Lemma 1 (Description of the Equilibrium) In the unique equilibrium of the game, the action of














Lemma 1 describestheequilibriumstrategy followed by individuals, asa function ofthecomposition
of the community in which they interact. Each individual selects an action that is a weighted average
of his preferences, the average preferences of individuals of his same type across interactions, and those
of individuals of the other type. Notice that, substituting for ﬁt
i =„t +et +"i, the equilibrium action
at









Expression (4) clari…es the e¤ect that the presence of people of type t0 in the community – namely, a
positivevalueof ‚t0
– hason the behaviorof peopleoftype t. First, ‚t0
>0 inducesall typet individuals
to move their actions away from „t and towards „t0
– namely, their best estimate of the preferences of
type t0. This phenomenon works both ways: when their types mix, type A move their actions towards
„B, and type B move their actions towards „A. As a result of this process of integration, behaviors
across the two types become more similar than if the two types had been kept apart. In other words,
when di¤erent types mix, each type loses some of its peculiarity, to adopt part of the other type’s
behavior.11
Second, a the presence of type t0 also a¤ects kt, namely the weight people of type t put on their
personal preferences when selecting their actions. Thekey feature hereis that kt is strictly decreasing in
‚t0, the proportion of individuals of type t0 in thecommunity.12 Intuitively, the correlation between the
preferences of an individual of type t and those of an individual of type t0 is zero. Hence, the presence
of type t0 in the community reduces the usefulness for a type t of utilizing his private preferences for
making predictions about the actions of others. Each type t individual therefore decreases the weight
he places on his preferences when selecting his action. By inspection of (4), it is clear that a smaller kt
implies that actions areless a¤ected by the realizations of both type-speci…cand idiosyncraticshocksto
preferences. The following Lemma makes clear the consequences of this e¤ect in terms of within–type
variance of actions (or within–type cohesion).
11This shares similarities with Kuran and Sandholm (2007).
12The derivative of k




(1+￿¡￿(1¡‚t0))2 which is strictly negative given our assumptions on
the model parameters.
8Lemma 2 (Within–Type Variance of Actions) The variance of the actions of individuals of type
t =A; B around the mean type t –action in a community is strictly decreasing in ‚t0, the proportion of
type t0 6=t in the community.
Proof: See Appendix.
Lemma 2 illustrateshow thepresenceoftypet0 acts asa coordination (or cohesion-enhancing) device
on individuals of type t. Note that type t0 generate a direct and an indirect e¤ect on type t’s actions.
The direct e¤ect arises because typet individuals forecast that they will now interact with individuals of
type t0, and accordingly adjust their actions, by putting less weight on theirindividual preferences. The
indirect (or multiplier) e¤ect arises because each individual realizes that, through the direct e¤ect, all
individuals of type t will now put less weight on their private preferences when selecting their actions.
In turn, this decreases the weight put by each individual on his private preferences even further, and
so on. This multiplier e¤ect shares similarities with the social multiplier identi…ed by the literature
on social interactions (see for instance Glaeser et al. 2003). As a result of this e¤ect, small variations
in community composition may result in relatively large changes in individual behavior. For instance,
the introduction of even a very small share of type t0 in a community of type t will sensibly a¤ect the
actions of the incumbent members of the community.13
The following corollary shows that the cohesion-enhancing e¤ect of strangers is greater in commu-
nities where the preferences of incumbents are rather similar (i.e., ￿ is small) and people are concerned
with coordination, but not excessively so (i.e., ￿ takes intermediate values).
Corollary 1 The value of j dkt(‚t0
)=d‚t0
j is: (i) strictly decreasing in ￿; (ii) concave in ￿, reaching a
maximum at ￿ = ￿+1
2￿+‚t0
+1 2 [1=2; 1):
Proof: See Appendix.
Corollary 1 highlights how changes in the values of ￿ (the variance of idiosyncratic shocks to prefer-
ences) and ￿ (the weight of coordination in the utility function) a¤ect the coordinating role of strangers
on the incumbent members of a community.14 Consider …rst a high ￿. A high value of ￿ implies
that, even within the same type, personal preferences are not very informative of the preferences of
others. As a result, when predicting the preferences of others, people pay little attention to their per-
sonal preferences. This decreases the usefulness of strangers for increasing coordination. Hence, the
cohesion-enhancing e¤ect of strangers is inversely related to the value of ￿.
Now consider a high value of ￿. When selecting their actions, people put very little weight on their
taste parameter, since (i) they care little about satisfying their preferences and (ii) (as a result of (i))
13This can be seen by noticing that lim‚t0!0
dkt(‚t0
)
d‚t0 = ¡￿(1 ¡￿)
￿+1
(￿¡￿+1)2.





j would depend on ￿
t and ￿
t,




. (This can be easily seen by looking at the derivation of k
t in the Appendix). As a result, the values





j through their impact on the behavior of the incumbent population only.
9personal preferences are of little use for forecasting the actions of others. This reduces the cohesion-
enhancing e¤ect ofstrangers, since peopleput little weight on personal preferences anyway. What about
a low ￿? A low value of ￿ implies that, when deciding their actions, people are chie‡y concerned with
satisfying their personal preferences. As a result, coordination in homogeneous communities is low.
However, the cohesion-enhancing e¤ect of strangers is also low. This is because, since the incumbents
arenot particularly desirous of coordinating with them, the presence of “di¤erent” individuals has only
a minimal e¤ect on the incumbents’ choice of actions.
Overall, therefore, strangers are most e¤ective in enhancing coordination among incumbents when
￿ is neither too high, nor too low.
3.1 Community Cohesion
In recent times, governments have been increasingly promoting the idea that “Community Cohesion”
should be fostered and encouraged. For instance, in the United Kingdom a Community Cohesion Unit
hasrecently been createdwithin the HomeO¢ce, to overseeinitiatives on building community cohesion.
In addition to the ministerial group, there are also several advisory groups and taskforces such as the
Community Cohesion Review Team. As part of this initiative, the Local Government Association
(LGA), together with the Home O¢ce, has recently issued a draft guidance to local authorities on
mainstreaming and promoting community cohesion.15 Similar initiatives – such as the project for
“BuildingtheNew American Community”, sponsored by theNational ConferenceofStateLegislatures16
– have also been on the rise in the United States. It is therefore important to investigate whether we
should expect mixed or homogeneous communities to be more cohesive. This is what we do in this
section. Since the concept of community cohesion is in itself quite vague, it is …rst necessary to make
clear how we de…ne it in the present context.
De…nition: We de…ne community cohesion as the variance of the actions of individuals within a
community around the community mean action.
As seen in Lemma 2, introducing a fraction of type t0 in a community increases the within–type
cohesion of individuals of type t. However, it also introduces a new source of variance, arising from
between–type variations in the choice of actions. Proposition 1 spells out the su¢cient conditions for
the latter e¤ect to be weaker than the former.
Proposition 1 (Community Cohesion) The su¢cientcondition for community cohesion to be greater










15“Community Cohesion: An Action Guide”, available at www.lga.gov.uk.
16Details are available at http://www.ncls.org/programs/immig/community_orr.htm.
10Proposition 1 shows that, for some parameter values, cohesion may be higher in mixed as opposed
to homogeneous communities. Consider for instance ￿ = 3=4, ￿ = 1. Then the condition for mixed
communitiesto bemore cohesivethan homogeneous communitiesis that j „A¡„B j< 3. More generally,
keeping everything elseequal, therighthandsideofthecondition lain out inproposition 1 isincreasing in
￿, and decreasing in ￿. First, consider ￿. From corollary 1, a large ￿ decreases theusefulness of utilizing
one’s preferences for predicting the preferences of others. This decreases the cohesion-enhancing e¤ect
of strangers, and makes the result harder to obtain. Now consider ￿. A large value of ￿ implies that,
when selecting their actions, people pay less attention to their personal preferences, and are instead
more concerned about coordinating with others. This decreases the coordination-enhancing e¤ect of
strangers (as seen in corollary 1), but it also decreases the variance of the actions of the newcomers. In
this case, the latter e¤ect is dominant.
Proposition 1 contravenes the often–heard argument that heterogeneity results in less cohesion.17
We show that this argument may be incorrect. Although di¤erences between types are indeed a source
of greater variance in actions, in mixed communities individuals of the same type select actions that
are closer to one another. For certain parameter values, this second e¤ect may dominate, and result
in greater community cohesion. Empirically, therefore, our model predicts that mixed communities
may indeed exhibit lower variance of actions than homogeneous ones. This more likely in environments
where (i) people care su¢ciently about coordinating with others and (ii) idiosyncratic shocks are not
very important, so that the preferences of people of the same type are never too dispersed. To the
extent to which di¤erences in behavior generate frictions, or even con‡ict, our result therefore suggests
that mixed communities may actually be more harmonious and peaceful than homogeneous ones.
3.2 Preferences over Community Composition
We now investigate the preferences of individuals with respect to community composition. We do so
by taking an ex-ante perspective, evaluating the expected utility of an individual as a function of the
composition of his community. The idea is to gain a better understanding of the welfare characteristics
of di¤erent types of communities. Are individuals always better o¤ in homogeneous communities? Or
are they willing to introduce some “di¤erent” people in their communities? In this latter case, how
large is the share of strangers that people are willing to introduce? These are the types of questions
that we wish to address in this section.
Substituting for the optimal action (3) into the utility function, wesee that an individual’s expected
utility can be written as




(aj ¡E(aj j ﬁi))
2 j ﬁi
´i
=¡￿2E(Var(aj j ﬁi)) (5)
where Var(aj j ﬁi) indicates the conditional variance of aj around E(aj j ﬁi), i’s expectation of aj
17The British media and political discourse on the eroding e¤ects of diversity on social cohesion is an example. See D.
Goodhart, “Too Diverse” Prospect, February 2004 and “The Kindness of Strangers. A report on Multiculturalism”, The
Economist, 28 February 2004, pp. 3-4 for illustrations of the current debate on diversity in British society.
11conditional on ﬁi.
In words, Var(aj j ﬁi) denotes the accuracy with which i is able to forecast the average action
of others in his group. In this sense, (5) captures the amount of strategic uncertainty present in the
game. An individual’s expected utility is therefore inversely proportional to the amount of strategic
uncertainty he faces.
The e¤ect of community composition on strategic uncertainty is ambiguous. Consider a type t
individual (individual i), whose community changes from being entirely composed of type t to also
including a fraction of type t0. Because the preferences of t0 individuals are entirely uncorrelated to his
own, the change in the composition of i’s community introduces people, over whom i possesses little
information. In particular, theprecision with which i can forecast thepreferences oftypet0 islowerthan
the precision with which he can forecast those of type t. Whether this translates into greater strategic
uncertainty depends on the extent to which typet0 follow their preferences when selecting their actions.
If￿ issmall – so that individualscaremostly about selecting actions that match their preferences – then
predicting the actions of type t0 in a mixed community is indeed always harder for i than predicting
the actions of individuals of his same type t in a homogeneous community.18 If on the other hand ￿ is
large – so that people are su¢ciently concerned about coordination – this happens only when the share
of type t0 in the mixed community is above a certain threshold, namely, ‚t0
> b ‚ for some b ‚ 2 (0;1).
Overall, therefore, heterogeneity may impose some costs, arising from the fact that the actions of
strangers may be harder to predict than those of individuals of our same type. This is summarized in
the following lemma.
Lemma 3 (Cost of Heterogeneity) Suppose that ￿ < 1 +￿ ¡
p
￿+￿2. Then, the precision with
which, in a mixed community, an individual of type t = A; B can forecast the actions of individuals of
type t0 6=t is always lower than the precision with which he can forecast the actions of other individuals
of type t in a homogeneous community. If ￿ >1+￿¡
p
￿+￿2 then there exists a value b ‚ 2 (0; 1) such
that this is the case whenever ‚t0
> b ‚.
Proof: See Appendix.
Lemma 3 shows that heterogeneity may impose some direct costs, since it introduces individuals
with preferences that are less predictable than those of people similar to us. However, heterogeneity
also has bene…ts. These can be divided in two categories. First, there are the bene…ts that derive from
the fact that community composition a¤ects individual behavioral choices. As seen in the previous
section, the move from a homogeneous to a heterogeneous community has a coordination-enhancing
e¤ect, in that it decreases the weight put by incumbent agents on their preferences when selecting their
18Since, as will become clear below, the actions of individuals of type t become easier to predict the smaller ‚
t (equiva-
lently, the larger ‚
t0
) this actually holds when considering the actions of type t in any community. However, here we are
discussing whether heterogeneity is desirable or not, so the appropriate benchmark is the predictability of actions of type
t in a homogeneous community.
12actions. In turn, this implies that their actions are less a¤ected by the realizations of type-speci…c and
idiosyncratic shocks to preferences, and are therefore easier to predict.
Note that being part of a mixed community a¤ects the behavior of the newcomers in the same way,
namely, by making their actions less dependent on their personal preferences. The extent to which this
happens is inversely proportional to their share in the mixed community. If the share of newcomers
in the community is su¢ciently small (and if ￿ is su¢ciently large) their actions may actually end up
being easier to predict for the incumbentsthan the actions ofothers of their sametypein a homogenous
community.19 In this case, heterogeneity bene…ts the incumbents in two ways: it makes the actions of
other incumbents easier to predict, and it introduces people who are themselves very predictable. In
both instances, the gain stems from the e¤ect of heterogeneity on individual behavior.
To sum up, one of the bene…ts of heterogeneity is that a¤ects individual behavior, causing peopleto
put lessweight on theirpersonal preferences (whichdecreasesstrategicuncertainty). Thisissummarized
in lemma 4.
Lemma 4 (First Bene…t of Heterogeneity) The precision with which an individual of type t =
A;B can forecast the actions of others of his same type in his interacting group is increasing in ‚t0, the
share of individuals of type t0 6= t in the community. Moreover: if ￿ > 1 +￿ ¡
p
￿+￿2, then there
exists a value b ‚ 2 (0; 1) such that, when ‚t0
< b ‚, the precision with which an individual of type t can
forecast the actions of type t0 6=t is greater than the precision with which he can forecast the actions of
other individuals of type t in a homogeneous community.
Proof: See Appendix.
There is also another bene…t of heterogeneity, which does not depend on the e¤ect that community
composition has on people’s choice of actions, but is purely a diversi…cation e¤ect. Since type-speci…c
shocks are uncorrelated, mistakes incurred when predicting the average action of type A and those
incurred when predicting that of type B partially o¤set each other. In other words, since the range
of behaviors that coexist in mixed groups is wider, the risk that your behavior is entirely out of line
with the averageis lower than in homogeneous groups. Hence, theprobability ofbecoming an “outlier”
is smaller. In this sense, therefore, mixed communities can be seen as more tolerant. This cultural
diversi…cation e¤ect is summarized in lemma 5.
Lemma 5 (Second Bene…t of Heterogeneity) Suppose the weight assigned by individuals on their
personal preferences is independent of community composition. Then introducing a su¢ciently small
fraction of people of a di¤erent type in an otherwise homogeneous community reduces aggregate strategic
uncertainty.
Proof: See Appendix.
19However, as highlighted in lemma 3, this may never occur once ‚
t0
surpasses a certain threshold.
13We are now ready to state our result on preferences over community composition. Consider an
individual i of type t = A; B. It is straightforward to verify that, for this individual, E(Var(aj j ﬁi))
is strictly convex in ‚t0
and reaches a minimum at ‚t0
= ‚¤ 2 (0;0:5). Hence, some heterogeneity
unambiguously decreases the amount of strategic uncertainty faced by individual i. As ‚t0
increases,
however, the direct cost described in lemma 3 becomes gradually more important, and eventually takes
over. The strategic uncertainty faced by i is minimized when the share of individuals belonging to a
di¤erent type than i is somewhere between zero and one-half.
Proposition 2 (Preferences over Community Composition) Agents always prefer to interact in
mixed as opposed to homogeneous communities. However, individuals exhibit a self-bias, in that their
expected utility is maximized when the share of people of their type in the community is greater than
one-half.
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 2 establishes that individuals of each type would ideally like to include a positive but
minoritarian fraction ofthe other type in their communities. The rationale for the …rst result – namely,
that individuals would like to include a positive fraction of the other type in their community – arises
because the possible cost of introducing a very small fraction of strangers in the community is only
second-order, since it is proportional to their share in the community. In contrast, the bene…ts are…rst-
order. Hence, introducing an arbitrarily small share of the other type in a homogeneous community is
unambiguously welfare-improving: it generates …rst-order bene…ts, and only a second-order cost (if at
all).
Given perfect symmetry between the two types, the variance of actions encountered in a community
where, say, ‚A = 0:3, ‚B = 0:7 is identical to that of a community where ‚A = 0:7, ‚B = 0:3. The
amount of strategic uncertainty faced by individuals, however, is di¤erent. A type A individual will
face less strategic uncertainty in the latter case than the former (and vice-versa for a type B). This is
essentially the rationale for the second result – namely, that individual preferences exhibit a self-bias,
in that their ideal community is one where their type is majoritarian.
The self-bias identi…ed in proposition 2 describes an e¤ect that shares some similarity with the
literature on discrimination (such as Becker 1957), in that it shows that people would rather not in-
troduce too many strangers in their community. However, rather than assuming from the outset that
people su¤er from a “natural aversion to heterogeneity” (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002: 225), here the
self-bias e¤ect is derived endogenously. This allows us to gain better understanding of why this e¤ect
may emerge. Moreover, in contrast with previous literature, we …nd that aversion to strangers is not
constant, but varies with community composition. Indeed, the self-bias e¤ect only kicks in when the
share of people of di¤erent type present in the community is su¢ciently high. As shown in proposition
2, communities unambiguously bene…t from having a few strangers around. Hence, our model pre-
dicts that homogeneous communities should generally welcome the arrival of individuals of a di¤erent
14type. As the share of those strangers in the community grows, however, attitudes should become less
welcoming. This latter prediction is a consequence of the self-bias e¤ect.
We now explore whether it is possible to construct communities that are simultaneously preferred
by both types over homogeneous communities, composed exclusively of individuals of their own type.
This is important, as it gives a measure of the sustainability of mixed communities in practice.
Proposition 3 (Simultaneous Preference for Mixed vs. Homogeneous Communities) The nec-
essary and su¢cient condition for the existence of mixed communities that are simultaneously preferred




The condition lain out in proposition 3 is easier to satisfy (i) the larger ￿ and (ii) the larger ￿. The
reason for (i) is essentially the same as in proposition 1. Now consider (ii). As seen in corollary 1, a
greater ￿ reduces the cohesion-enhancing e¤ect of strangers, and this should make the result harder to
obtain. However, a large ￿ also has other e¤ects. First, it makes individuals of the other type more
predictable, since they pay less attention to their idiosyncratic preferences.20 Moreover, in some cases,
a larger ￿may makeindividuals of one own’s type less predictable(since one’s own personal preferences
are a noisier signal of those of others of the same type).21 The overall outcome is that a large ￿ makes
mixed communities relatively more desirable.
Note that 1¡
p
￿+2￿2 < 1 +￿ ¡
p
￿+￿2. Hence, proposition 3 holds also in the worst possible
case, namely when – as seen in lemma 3 – ￿ is su¢ciently small to ensure that the actions of strangers
arealways less predictablethan those ofindividualsofourown type (and thisis trueeven if we consider
the actions of those of our own type in a homogeneous community).
To sum up, therefore, proposition 3 establishes that mixing in the same community may simulta-
neously bene…t both types. Although individuals would ideally like to live in communities where their
type is majoritarian, the bene…ts generated by mixing may be su¢ciently large to ensure that people
prefer mixed over homogeneous communities even when their type is not majoritarian. This is more
likely to hold in environments where people care su¢ciently about coordinating with others, and/or the
preferences of people of the same type are su¢ciently dispersed.
4 Implications and Extensions
Implications Our analysis has highlighted how heterogeneity produces bene…ts, as well as costs.
A question that may naturally ariseis whetherit ispossibleto eliminatethecosts associated with mixed
20The logic for this is highlighted in the discussion following corollary 1. Formally, the e¤ect can be seen by noticing






21This can be seen by noticing that, as shown in the Appendix, the strategic uncertainty faced by type t when forecasting





t is decreasing in ￿,
￿
￿+1 is an increasing function of ￿.
The net result of these opposing e¤ects depends on parameter values.
15communities without a¤ecting their bene…ts. Our analysis suggests that this may unfortunately not be
possible. Thebene…tsand costs ofmixed communities aretwo facesofthe samecoin: strangersgenerate
bene…ts precisely because their preferences are uncorrelated with those of incumbents – a feature that,
in turn, makes their preferences harder to predict. Policies aimed at decreasing the direct costs of
heterogeneity – such as policies aimed at assimilation, namely the homogenization of preferences across
types22 – will therefore also eliminate its less visible bene…ts.
Another interesting conclusion that emerges from our model is that the costs of heterogeneity have
theirrootsin strategicuncertainty – namely, individual ability to makepredictionsofothers’ preferences
– rather than di¤erences between types per se. Assimilation is therefore only one route through which
these costs can be softened. Campaigns aimed at familiarizing people with those belonging to di¤erent
types would lower the uncertainty faced when dealing with them, and would therefore achieve the same
objective. However, as noted above, policies that reduce the direct costs of heterogeneity will also have
the e¤ect of decreasing its less direct bene…ts (although to a lesser extent than policies of assimilation,
since preferences would nonetheless remain uncorrelated).
Dynamic Extensions One way in which our model can be extended to a dynamic framework is
to have people utilize past experience to makes predictions about the behavior of others. Although a
full analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, it seems reasonable to conjecture that, at least at …rst,
people should have more familiarity with individuals of their same type. This provides an additional
rationalefor why they may beableto betterassess their preferences and therefore actions. As timegoes
by, however, people accumulate interactions with the “newcomers”. This suggests that, over time, the
precision of people’s predictions on the preferences of those of a di¤erent type should improve. Hence,
the direct cost associated with heterogeneity should decrease. Importantly, this happens even in the
absence of homogenization of preferences across types.
Although more precise, the predictions that people make of the preferences of those of another
type should over time also become more dispersed, since they will be based on an individual’s private
experience. As di¤erent types interact more and more with one another, therefore, both the direct cost
associated with heterogeneity – arising from the unpredictability of strangers – and the indirect bene…t
identi…ed in lemma 4 – arising from their coordination-enhancing e¤ect – will lose strength.
More Than Two Types A natural question that may arise concerns the e¤ect of having more
than two types interact with one another. Although a full analysis of this case is beyond the scope of
this work (and is therefore left to future research), here we can sketch a few intuitions. Intuitively, if
strangers belong to several di¤erent types, incumbents should modify their behavior using a weighted
22For instance, in the UK, policy makers have recently abandoned the dominant approach of multiculturalism in favor
of what some call “a return to assimilation” – Letki (2007), citing Cheong and al. (2005). Another example – borrowed
from Kuran and Sandholm (2007) citing Schlessinger (1991) – is the policy pursued in the US in the early 20th century.
In one of his speeches, president Woodrow Wilson argued that “A man who thinks of himself as belonging to a particular
national group in America has not yet become an American”. Similarly, during the fascist regime in Italy, people of foreign
origin were strongly encouraged to assimilate with the natives, even to the extent of “italianizing” their family names.
16average of their prior information on these types (where weights re‡ect the relative share ofeach type).
All types will therefore move their actions in a direction that is somewhere in the middle of the other
types’ predicted preferences, but that does not necessarily re‡ect any particular type’s.
Another implication of having more than two types is that the self-bias e¤ect should now take a
milder form: individuals would like to live in communities where their type has a larger share than any
of the other types – though not necessarily exceeding one-half.
Asymmetries Tokeeptheanalysisassimpleaspossible, wehaverestrictedattentiontosymmetric
environments. More generally, however, the values of ￿ – capturing concern for coordination – and ￿
– the (relative) variance of idiosyncratic shocks to preferences – may be type-dependent. This type of
analysis may be especially interesting for providing information as to which types are more willing to
introduce strangers in their communities. Are these characterized by high or low values of ￿ and/or
￿? Consider the limit as ￿t ! 1 and/or ￿t ! 0. Intuitively, when ￿t ! 1, people of type t only
care about coordinating with others. In a homogeneous community, composed only of type t, we then
have a continuum of equilibria, all characterized by people perfectly coordinating with one another.
Similarly, when ￿t ! 0, the personal preferences of all individuals of type t are identical. Again,
in a homogeneous community, perfect coordination can then be achieved. In both instances, type–
t homogenous communities are characterized by no strategic uncertainty at all. For type t, the ideal
share‚¤ ofpeopleoftypet0 is therefore equal to zero. By continuity, for types characterized by very high
￿t and/or very small ￿t, the value of ‚¤ is correspondingly very small – in fact smaller than for all other
types.23 Homogeneous communities where people care very much about coordination and/or where
people have very similar preferences are thus the least welcoming towards strangers. By a similar logic
, this should also generally apply to communities where there is very little uncertainty over individual
preferences. Consider a dynamic setting, where idiosyncratic shocks to preferences are correlated over
time. Under these circumstances, uncertainty about individual preferences should be lower in small
environments, where the same people keep on interacting with each other. This would match casual
evidence that very small communities are generally less open to newcomers than larger communities.
Dispersion of Prior Beliefs In ouranalysis, wehave assumed that both „A and „B arecommon
knowledge to all players. An implication of this is that the forecast that type individuals t make of the
preferences of type t0 6= t is the same for all (since it corresponds to the prior „t0). This strengthens
the coordination-enhancing e¤ect of strangers, and could at …rst glance appear to be a major driving
force for our results. This may be troublesome, since, in real life, it seems reasonable that beliefs over
the preferences of strangers may di¤er across individuals. It is therefore important to explain what
would happen if beliefs on „t0
di¤ered across type t individuals. Consider the following modi…cation
of our model. All type t = A;B individuals know the value of „t. However, their beliefs over „t0
are dispersed, since each individual i only receives a signal „t0
i = „t0
+xi where xi » N (0;X) for a
23Note however that this does not imply that ‚
¤ is always decreasing in ￿
t and/or increasing in ￿
t. In some ranges, we
may get non-monotonicities. Details are omitted but are avaible from the authors upon request.
17positive constant X, with xi ? xj. Suppose that the common prior over „t0
for all type t individuals
is uniform over R. This implies that, for each individual i of type t, his best estimate of „t0
is given
by his private signal „t0
i . It is straightforward to verify that, with this modi…cation, our results would
remain qualitatively unchanged. In particular, proposition 2 would still hold, implying that individuals
would always bene…t from introducing a positive share of strangers in their community. Although the
presence of type t0 introduces noise in type t individual’s actions (since „t0
i di¤ers across individuals),









The weight put by individual i on „t0
i is proportional to ‚t0, the share of type t0 in the community.
Hence, for small ‚t0, the additional variation in actions introduced by heterogeneous „t0
i is correspond-
ingly small. In contrast, as seen above, the bene…ts of mixed communities are …rst-order.
Note however that variations in „t0
i would introduce an extra cost ofmixed communities, in addition
to that discussed in the main text.
5 Concluding Remarks
What happens when di¤erent types of people are mixed in the same community? Is there any reason
why di¤erent types ofpeopleshouldwishto bemixed in thesamecommunity? Isit truethat individuals
exhibit a “tastefordiscrimination”, in that they arealways better o¤when they interact only with other
individuals of their same type? We believe that our analysis may have provided a useful theoretical
contribution to these debates. Starting from preferences that are not directly de…ned over community
composition, we have shown that individuals behave di¤erently in mixed as opposed to homogeneous
environments. From this, we have identi…ed the bene…ts and costs of heterogeneity from an individual
welfare perspective. We have shown that preferences over community composition depend on strategic
uncertainty – theability topredict theactionsofothers. Strangershavepreferences thatareuncorrelated
to ourown, and may thereforebecostly to interact with. Importantly, however, thisdirect cost ofmixed
communities arises not because strangers have di¤erent preferences per se, but because, as a result of
them having di¤erent preferences, their actions may be more di¢cult to predict. Mixed communities
also havebene…ts, which arehowevermore subtlethantheircosts. First, strangersact as a coordination
device, and make coordination among incumbents easier. Second, they also generate what we call a
cultural diversi…cation e¤ect, by making aggregate actions less dependent on type-speci…c shocks. The
bene…tsofheterogeneity aresu¢ciently strong to ensurethat communitiesalways gain from introducing
some “di¤erent” individuals in their midst, and that individuals of both types may simultaneously be
better o¤ in mixed as opposed to homogeneous communities.
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20Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: We …rst characterize the linear equilibrium of the game. We then argue that this
is also the unique equilibrium.





















TheshareofindividualsoftypeA in thecommunity is‚A, and that oftypeB is‚B (where‚A+‚B =1).
















































The preferences of a generic type A individual do not inform him on the preferences of a generic type
B individual, and consequently type A can only predict that the preferences of the type B agents he
will be matched with are the average preference, „B. In contrast, the preferences of individuals of the





























where the prediction of the type-speci…c shock to preferences of type A individuals, eA, is given by the
linear regression of eA against the information available to agent i, namely ﬁi and „A (see Morris and
24It is straightforward to verify that, since there is continuum of individuals, all have the same …rst order condition.
Hence, all equilibria must be symmetric.



























































































































We now have a system, composed of (11) and (23), where kA and kB are given by (16) and (22), that
allows us to solve for –A and –B. It is straightforward to verify that, substituting for ‚t0
=1 ¡‚t, the








for t = A; B (and t0 = B;A).
Uniqueness: To prove theuniqueness of the linearequilibrium, we follow therouteexplored by Morris
22and Shin (2002) and generalized by Angeletos and Pavan (2007 (a)). In order to make sure that the
expected action chosen in equilibrium across agents is …nite, we add an extra assumption consisting in
assuming that all action belong to the bounded and closed interval [¡M;M],
ai 2 [¡M; M] for any i; (24)
where M is a positive real number. Moreover we assume that the number of agents interacting is
…nite, equal to J, and we let JA and JB be the number of agents of each type. The proportion ‚t
is consequently equal to Jt=J. The proof consists then of two parts: …rst, under the assumption that
￿ 2 (0;1), we show that under some conditions on the distribution of unobserved individual preferences
ﬁt
ii=1;:::;J, thegamehasauniquesymmetricequilibriumin which all agentsplay according tothestrategy
derived above. Then we show that when M and J go to in…nity, the probability of the distribution of
preferences under which this equilibrium exists goes to 1, ruling out asymmetric equilibria.
Under the assumption that actions must belong to the closed interval [¡M;M], and since ￿ > 0,
the reaction function of a generic individual i is given by
ai =
8
> > > > > > <














































denotes the expected action of the average individual with whom individual i is
matched, given its preferences ﬁt
i. Given our assumptions on the number of agents, at
j, which denotes
the average action of individuals of type t excluding agent i and at0
j , which denotes the average action
































































Substituting for the averageaction of individuals j, and using agents best responsesgiven by thesecond




















































































































































We can reiterate the process of substituting the average action of individuals a¡j with its expression as
a function of private tastes and conditional expectation of the actions individual ¡j is interacting with
... as it is done in Morris and Shin (2002). In the limit of this substitution process, the action of agent
i is equal to the sum of a coe¢cient that goes to 0 times the conditional expectation of the conditional
expectation... up to in…nity ... of the average action of individual other than i, plus a combination of
„t, „t0
and ﬁt
i. As all actions must belong to (¡M;M) for this computation to hold, we know that the
in…nite conditional expectation is bounded (it belongs to (¡M; M)), and therefore the product term
that contains it disappears, as it is equal to an element that goes to 0 times an element which is …nite.
Action ai is therefore equal to a combination of „t, „t0
and ﬁt

























i ¸ maxf(¡M ¡‚B￿„B +(1¡‚B￿¡kA)„A)=kA; (¡M ¡‚A￿„A +(1 ¡‚A￿¡kB)„B)=kBg (34)
If the order statistics do not verify these conditions, which is possible for M and J …nite, there may
be asymmetric equilibria in which some individuals select the upper or the lower bound of the action
space, while some others select an action strictly in between the two bounds. It may also be the case
that there exist no equilibrium in pure strategy. We proved none of these two results. However, as the
tastes are normality distributed, when M and J go to in…nity the order statistics supi;t ﬁt
i and infi;t at
i
verify the two inequalities above with probability 1 (with M > J to avoid the convergence of the order
statistic quicker to in…nity than the bound of the action space). Therefore the symmetric equilibrium
we derived is unique when M and J go to in…nity. ¥



















































































´3 < 0 (39)
since, under the assumption that ￿ and ‚t0
are both in between 0 and 1, the denominator is strictly
negative.¥





2. Straightforward calculations show
that this is strictly decreasing in ￿, and it is concave in ￿, reaching a maximum at ￿ = ￿+1
2￿+‚t0
+1. ¥
Proof of Proposition 1: The average action in the community composed of a share ‚A of type A and



































































































































Condition(45) ensuresthat by introducing a small share ofindividualsof typet0 = B; A in a community
of individuals of type t =A;B, community variance decreases.¥
Proof of Lemma 3: Let at






for t =A;B. This takescare of average actions. What about expectationsofaverage actions? Consider




















































































Now consider an heterogeneous community. Suppose that ‚B =‚ >0. From (48), and substituting for
¡
































































































If ￿ < ￿ + 1 ¡
p
















for all values of ‚. If ￿ > ￿ +1 ¡
p
￿+￿2 the righthandside of (55) is positive,















b ‚. This proves the result.¥
27Proof of Lemma 4: Again, without loss of generality consider an individual i if type A. Following









￿+1. From lemma 1, we know that
kA =(1¡￿) ￿+1
￿¡￿‚A+1 =(1¡￿) ￿+1
￿¡￿(1¡‚B)+1, given ‚A = 1¡‚B. Since kA is decreasing in ‚B, the …rst
result follows. The second result is proved above (proof of lemma 3).¥





























































Keeping the behavior of individuals constant, introducing an in…nitesimally small fraction of type B in
a community composed only of type A decreases aggregate strategic uncertainty. The same argument
applies for an in…nitesimally small fraction of type A in a community composed only of type B.¥




(aj ¡E(aj j ﬁi))
2 j ﬁi
´i
isstrictly convex in ‚t0
and reaches a minimum at ‚t0
= ‚¤ 2 (0; 0:5). Supposewithout lossofgenerality


































after substituting for ﬁA
i =„A +eA +"i
(60)












































































































3 > 0 (66)




(aj ¡E(aj j ﬁi))2 j ﬁA
i
´i
reaches a minimum at









reaches a minimum at ‚A =‚¤ 2 (0;0:5).¥
Proof of Proposition 3: A su¢cient condition for the proposition to hold is that both types are
strictly bettero¤ina mixed community with50/50 typecomposition thanin ahomogeneouscommunity.



















































Given perfect symmetry between the two types, (67) and (68) are also necessary for the proposition to
























































>0 if ￿ > 1¡
p
￿+2￿2.¥
30